Most poverty analysts agree that poverty is multidimensional, in theory. In practice, empirical poverty studies are overwhelmingly univariate, with most economists limiting their attention to income or expenditures. This paper is part of a larger research agenda that aims to bring the empirical literature closer to the widely accepted theory. In particular, we show that it is both interesting and practicable to make general poverty comparisons when poverty is measured using more than one dimension of well-being. This study follows previous work that addressed this same issue for the case of two or more continuous measures of well-being.
The innovation here is to consider multidimensional poverty comparisons when one or more of the indicators of well-being is discrete. This is of considerable practical importance, since important dimensions of well-being such as literacy and political enfranchisement are usually considered as discrete. In addition, discrete data are often collected for dimensions that are in fact continuous: income may be grouped into ranges rather than reported directly; respondents may be asked to rank their health status on a scale from 1 to 5, etc. As it happens, the methods that we use also provide a way to avoid the arbitrary choice of household equivalence scales in standard univariate poverty comparisons, a result first developed in Atkinson (1992) and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) .
The approach in this paper is genuinely multidimensional. We do not aggregate several dimensions of well-being into a single index as is sometimes done elsewhere in the literature. Such aggregation involves arbitrary value judgments about the relative importance of each dimension of well-being which we prefer to avoid. 1 Our intellectual debt to Anthony Atkinson is obvious throughout the paper. Atkinson (1987) pioneered the use of stochastic dominance techniques in poverty analysis. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) is a seminal contribution to the literature on comparisons of wellbeing in multiple dimensions. And Atkinson (1992) and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) develop a specific example of the general problem that we consider, in which welfare is measured in the dimensions of income, a continuous variable, and household size, a discrete one.
Section 1 provides our main theoretical results for robust poverty comparisons when well-being is measured in two dimensions, one continuous and the other discrete. We consider two cases, depending on whether or not the class of poverty measures of interest is continuous at the poverty line. Proofs may be found in the appendix. Section 2 provides an estimator and sampling distribution for the tests proposed in section 1. Section 3 expands the results of section 1 to the case of one continuous and two (or more) discrete measures of well-being. Section 4 provides examples, and section 5 concludes.
Multivariate poverty comparisons with one discrete and one continuous indicator of wellbeing
Suppose that a population can be split into K exhaustive and exclusive population subgroups, whose population share is denoted by ( ) 1 , = ,..., . We can define these subgroups based on a discrete welfare measure such as literacy, political enfranchisement, access to a public service, or physical capabilities. Alternatively, we can differentiate households by their relative needs, based on size and composition, type of activities, or area of residence. In either case, the important point is that these discrete differences in the characteristics of households or individuals suggest that, for a given value of the continuous measure of well-being, certain groups have lower overall well-being than others. This can be because the discrete variable is itself a measure of well-being (being illiterate is worse than being literate), or because it indicates differences in needs, prices, or poverty lines. In addition, we can suppose that there is some uncertainty as to the precise value of these differences.
We will assume below that the K subgroups can be ordered in increasing value of a discrete measure of well-being, in such a way that at common values of another, continuous, measure of well-being, individuals in subgroup 1 are more deprived than individuals in subgroup 2, who are more deprived than individuals in subgroup 3, and so on. For now, we assume that there is only one discrete variable (and thus a one-dimensional ordinal ranking of the K subgroups at some common value of the continuous measure), but we will later generalize the analysis to the case of several such discrete variables.
As is standard in the literature, for simplicity we limit our attention to poverty measures that are additive, so that poverty in each of the population subgroups can be defined as: 
Total poverty in the population is given by:
For expositional simplicity, we will sometimes denote ( (1) ( )) ,..., P z z K simply by P . One such poverty index is the sum of FGT indices (see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984)) across subgroups, each with its own poverty line. Denote the FGT(α) index for subgroup k and parameter α , times the population share of group k, by
Total poverty as measured by the FGT index is then:
Note that 0 ( (1) ( )) ,..., P z z K is the population headcount, with each subgroup k being assigned its specific poverty line ( ) z k . Similarly, 1 ( (1) ( )) ,..., P z z K is the average poverty gap in the population, again with each subgroup k being assigned its specific poverty line ( ) z k . Other multidimensional additive poverty indices can be defined along similar lines, extending, for instance, the unidimensional Watts (1968) or Chakravarty (1983) poverty indices.
Rather than focus on any one poverty index, however, we want to establish conditions under which multivariate poverty will be lower in one group than in another for any poverty index in a broad class of indices, in the tradition of the stochastic dominance approach to poverty comparisons (Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988a, b, c) . The conditions for such 'poverty dominance' differ for poverty indices that are continuous vs. discontinuous at the poverty line. We treat the continuous case first because it is somewhat simpler.
Continuous poverty indices
, , z … z K to be a class of multidimensional first-order poverty indices. 1 ( (1) ( )) Π , , z … z K includes all of the additive P indices defined in equation (2) that satisfy three conditions:
where (1) 1 ( ) x π is the first-order derivative of 1 ( ) x π with respect to x. The first condition says that the poverty lines in the continuous dimension for the subgroups can be ordered from the poorest (neediest) to the richest (least needy) group. This is a sensible ordering since we assume that for the same value of x , group k has lower well-being than group 1 + k , etc.
The second condition orders the first derivatives of ( ) k x π with respect to x . This assumption says that an increase in x causes at least as much poverty reduction the poorer is a person in the discrete dimension k . Roughly speaking, this assumption says that x and k are substitutes in the production of well-being. In most circumstances, this is a reasonable assumption -improving one dimension of well-being for those who are poorer in another dimension should generate greater poverty reduction than the same improvement for those who are richer in that dimension. However, it is possible that complementarity in the production of two dimensions of well-being might force a reversal. As an extreme case of complementarity, imagine poverty indices defined over continuous income and two discrete states, alive or dead. Hamlet aside, we probably want to rank 'alive' as better than 'dead', yet a reasonable poverty measure would probably fall by more if we increased the incomes of the living than the dead. 2 But we do not wish to consider such cases in the paper, in part because we feel that they are less empirically relevant.
The third condition assumes continuity of the poverty measure at the poverty line for 
Proof: See Appendix.
Recall that 0 ( ) ; P k ζ is the FGT(0) measure, or headcount, for subgroup k and poverty line ζ , times the population share of subgroup k . (1) z , and then by comparing the combined poverty headcounts of the two groups at all common poverty lines between 0 and (2) z . This is illustrated in Figure 1 , where
and (2) ζ denote the poverty lines at which poverty in each of the two subgroups is assessed. For 1 ( (1) (2) 
If the dominance conditions in (8) are met, then we obtain a very robust ordering of multidimensional poverty. Indeed, we can then assert with confidence that all of the multidimensional poverty indices contained in 1 ( (1
will show more poverty in A than in B , and this, regardless of the selection of any particular combination of poverty lines, so long as they belong to the set defined by (
Discontinuous poverty indices
The dominance condition becomes more stringent, however, if we include in the analysis the headcount and other indices that are discontinuous at the poverty line (in the manner, for instance, of Bourguignon and Fields (1997) ) and replace assumption (7) by the following:
This condition requires that the poverty measure for group k evaluated at a given x be at least as great as the poverty measure in the next neediest group 1 + k evaluated at the same value of x . This must hold for all k and for all x . A larger class
additive poverty indices then includes all the P indices defined in equation (2) that satisfy assumptions (5), (6), and (9). The 'traditional' headcount index, by which total poverty is measured by assigning each subgroup its own poverty line, belongs to (1) ( )) , , Π % z … z K leads to the following equivalence: Theorem 2. (First-order poverty dominance without continuity)
The first condition in (10) is identical to the one already discussed in (8) . In addition, we must check that the cumulative headcount differences are positive when each group k has its specific poverty line set to ( ) z k . That is the second condition in (10). In the two-group case of Figure 1 , this adds to the previously-discussed test locations one more test at point F on the figure. The dominance conditions are thus more demanding than before. More importantly, however, note also that the combinations of poverty lines over which the
ranking is robust are far more restricted than for the previous result: in fact, dominance by , z k as in (8), we must also check the sign of the cumulative headcount when each subgroup is assigned its specific poverty line, instead of a common value ζ . This new condition would need to be checked for all combinations of poverty lines (other than { (1) ( )} , , z … z K ) for which we would wish the poverty ordering 1 Π % to be robust. For the 2-group case, this requires checking for dominance at all of the combinations of poverty lines defined by the shaded area of Figure 1 . This is clearly a more stringent condition than that stated in Theorem 1, and it explains why we might wish to limit the generality of poverty orderings to a continuous class such as 1 ( (1) 
For second-order dominance, this would require that
Π would then be convex in y and thus decreasing in mean-preserving equalizing transfers of living standards; that is, they would obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers within each group. The convexity of ( ) k x π , and thus the importance of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, would also be assumed to be decreasing in k and hence increasing in the needs of the subgroups. At a given x , the greater the needs of a subgroup of individuals, the greater the poverty-relieving effect of a mean-preserving equalizing transfer within that subgroup. The dominance conditions would then use 1 ( ) ; P k ζ --which is the average poverty gap in subgroup k for a poverty line ζ , times the population share of subgroup k --and would cumulate it across the i most deprived subgroups to give (from panel data for instance). We can write these observations, drawn from a population
A natural estimator of the sum of the dominance curves
where ( ) ⋅ I equals 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. Expression (11) has the convenient property of being a simple sum of IID variables. We can then state:
L M A B , let the joint population moments of order 2 of 
(1) 
where ( ) f x k k * ; , is the density of those at x and in groups k and k * normalized such that its integral over x gives the population share of those in groups k and k * . We then have:
Theorem 4. (First-order poverty dominance for two discrete indicators and one continuous one) The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. Again, this is equivalent to checking the dominance conditions of Theorem 1 using all of the possible orderings of the discrete indicators.
Examples
Our first example for this section obviates the equivalence scale problem by using the method first suggested by Atkinson (1992) . We ask the question, 'which type of transfer payment reduces poverty more in Romania, child allowances or social security pensions?' Because the answer can easily be influenced by the choice of equivalence scale, we will avoid that choice altogether. Instead, we use bivariate dominance tests where the second dimension of wellbeing is household size, an indicator of greater needs. The neediest group is households with six or more people, 6 the next neediest contains households with five people, etc. The data come from the Romania Integrated Household Survey (Government of Romania 1994). The other well-being variable is household income, plus the relevant transfer payment (child allowances or social security pensions). We have standardized these payments so that they have the same mean, thus ensuring that the tests do not merely reflect the fact that one program is very large relative to the other. Table 1 gives the t-statistics for the differences in the dominance curves of the neediest group, the two neediest groups, etc., up to the entire sample, as required by Theorem 1. The difference is the dominance curve for income plus child allowances minus that for income plus social security pensions, so a positive t-statistic indicates that social security pensions are more poverty-reducing than child allowances, and vice-versa. For large households, child allowances clearly reduce poverty by more than social security payments, regardless of the poverty line chosen. But this result is reversed once we include households with only two people, where the dominance curves now cross, and where social security payments appear to be more beneficial to poorer households. The same pattern holds for s=2 and s=3 (involving the 'poverty gap' and 'poverty severity' curves, respectively), suggesting that we cannot make any robust statement as to the comparative poverty-reducing impact of these two transfer payments without excluding households of size 2 and 1. Thus, any dominance result derived with a particular equivalence scale will not be robust to the choice of that scale in this case, a result that is not too surprising given the very different demographic profile of households receiving these two transfers. This period spanned a significant economic crisis, including the hyperinflation of 1990-1991. In the previous example, using a bivariate poverty comparison impedes our ability to get a clear dominance between distributions even when the univariate expenditure distribution does show a statistically significant difference in poverty. While the stricter conditions for multivariate dominance might make us think that this is usually the case, it is also possible that when there is no univariate dominance in the continuous dimension, bivariate comparisons may produce useful dominance results, as we demonstrate in our next example. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) distinguish 'union' from 'intersection' definitions of poverty. In the former, one is considered poor if s/he falls below the poverty line in either dimension. In that latter, one is considered poor only if s/he falls below both poverty lines. Younger (2006a, 2006b) show that union poverty comparisons require univariate dominance in both dimensions, but intersection poverty comparisons do not. They give examples of cases in which there is no univariate dominance in one or both dimensions, but there is bivariate dominance for a set of intersection poverty measures. A similar result is possible in the present case of one discrete and one continuous measure of well-being. Table   3 compares poverty in Ecuador between 1998 and 1999, also a period of significant macroeconomic turmoil. The comparison is in two dimensions: real household expenditures per capita and area of residence, where we suppose that well-being is lower in rural than in urban areas. The second column shows that there is neither univariate dominance in the dimension of household expenditures nor bivariate dominance as defined in Theorem 1.
However, Column 1 shows that income poverty did decline unambiguously in rural areas for any choice of poverty line. Thus, we do have a dominance result for intersection poverty measures if the poverty line in the discrete dimension includes only rural residents, i.e. if only rural residents are considered to be poor in the dimension of area of residence. Table 4 gives these comparisons. Despite the rather demanding criteria, we do find that multidimensional poverty declined over this period in Britain for poverty lines up to the 55 th percentile of income distribution. Actual poverty in this period was about 19 percent, so it is safe to conclude that multivariate poverty declined during this period for all reasonable poverty lines.
<Table 4 about here>
As a more general check of this correspondence, we made trivariate poverty comparisons for each wave of the first 12 waves of the BHPS (except the ninth) for these combinations of variables: income/education/health; income/education/happiness; and income/health/happiness. 8 We set the maximum reasonable poverty line at the median of the joint income distribution for all waves. For the income/education/health comparisons similar to the one in Table 4 , the multivariate comparison rejects the null in favor of dominance in 15 of the 43 cases in which the univariate comparison for income per adult equivalent rejects the null. 9 For the income/happiness/education comparisons, we reject the null in the multivariate tests in 26 of 43 cases. But in the income/health/happiness comparisons, we reach the same conclusion in only 7 of 43 cases. 10 Thus, while use of the multivariate comparisons does make it more difficult to find that poverty differs significantly over time, it certainly does not make such a conclusion impossible.
Conclusion
This paper has drawn on two literatures to which Tony Atkinson was an early and influential contributor: one uses stochastic dominance methods to make very general poverty comparisons (Atkinson 1987) , and another studies poverty comparisons on multiple dimensions (Atkinson 1992; Atkinson and Bourguignon 1982) . Drawing on both those literatures, we have shown that it is possible to make robust multidimensional poverty comparisons when one or more of the dimensions of well-being is discrete. Practically, this is useful because many measures of well-being are either inherently discrete or are recorded as such. We have also seen that to make such comparisons, it is important to distinguish between discontinuous headcount-like multidimensional poverty indices and continuous ones. The importance of this distinction is well understood in the univariate poverty literature, being linked inter alia to whether poverty indices obey the Pigou-Dalton principle.
Finally, we have derived the sampling distributions for our multivariate poverty comparisons, so that they can be stated in a statistically meaningful way.
The examples presented highlight several key points about multivariate poverty comparisons that distinguish them from the standard univariate case. First, because multivariate comparisons appear to be more demanding than univariate ones, there is a concern that these tests will not be able to reject the null of non-dominance in practice. While this is true for most of the comparisons that we consider, we found many cases in which the null is rejected using surveys with typical sample sizes of a few thousand households.
Second, there are cases when a multivariate poverty comparison rejects the null for an intersection definition of poverty even when the univariate income comparison does not. This can occur when income poverty declines for a subset of the poorest groups of households but does not for all households. Third, for a lower range of poverty lines, it is also possible for multivariate poverty to increase even if the share of households in the poorest subset of discrete groups declines. This happens if income poverty of the poorest groups rises so much that the number of poor in those groups increases even though their overall number declines.
Each of these examples shows how a multivariate analysis can be richer and more subtle than poverty comparisons based on income alone.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof follows the line of Atkinson (1992) and Jenkins and Lambert (1993) . We first use (2) to integrate by parts the difference ∆P . We find:
Recall the continuity assumption that ( ( )) 0
Recall that (1) 
; combined with (5), we can then rewrite (20) as:
The inner sum in (21) can be rewritten as:
Denoting (1) 1 ( ) 0
, we can thus rewrite the right-hand-side of (21) as ( )
Note that by the definition of the class of indices 
, and
This proves the sufficiency of condition (8) .
For the necessity part, it suffices to consider any particular case in which for that index, which therefore shows the necessity of condition (8) .
Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider again equation (19):
The second line of condition (10) guarantees the non-negativity of the second line of (27), as shown before in the proof of Theorem 1. Denoting again
, rewrite the first term on the right-hand side of (26) as:
Note that by the definition of the class of indices
( ( 1)) 0 1 of the second parts of condition (10) guarantees that 0 ∆ > P .
The necessity of condition (10) proceeds as for the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.
For each distribution, the existence of the appropriate population moments of order 1 lets us apply the law of large numbers to (11),
Given also the existence of the population moments of order 2, the central limit theorem shows that the estimator in (11) is root-N consistent and asymptotically normal with asymptotic covariance matrix given by (12). Notes: Values in column 1 are each 5th percentile in the distribution of expenditures. A positive t-statistic in columns 2 through 7 indicates greater poverty for income plus child allowances than for income plus social security pensions. Source: Authors' calculation from the Romania Integrated Household Survey, 1994. 
